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An endogenous growth model with financial intermediation is used to show how public 
deposit insurance and weak prudential regulation can lead to banking crises and permanent 
declines in economic growth. The impact of regulatory forbearance on investment, saving and 
asset price dynamics under perfect foresight are derived in the model. The assumptions of the 
theoretical model are based on essential features of the Japanese financial system and its 
regulation. The model demonstrates how banking and growth crises can evolve under perfect 
foresight. The dynamics for economic aggregates and asset prices predicted by the model are 
shown to be generally consistent with the experience of the Japanese economy and financial 
system through the 1990s. We also test our maintained hypothesis of rational expectations 
using asset price data for Japan over the 1980s and 1990s. An implication of our analysis is 
that delaying the resolution of banking crises adversely affects future economic growth. 
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Since the early summer of 2003, Japan started to recover from its long recession. With this recovery, the
non-performing loan problems of the major banks appears to be abating. The major banks were helped by
large injections of equity from the government and a recovering economy that boosted profits, allowing the
major banks to increase their loan-loss reserves and capital-asset ratios. However, difficulties persist with
the regional banks, which have been slow to write-off their non-performing loans. Moreover, the growth
prospects for the Japanese economy are still uncertain. The persistent difficulties facing the banking sector
are a legacy of weak government financial regulation and prudential supervision. This paper considers the
possibility that public policy towards the financial system is the root cause of the Japanese banking and
growth crisis.
A simple endogenous growth model with a bank-centered financial system is presented and solved for
equilibrium in closed-form. Three stylized facts about the Japanese financial are incorporated into the as-
sumptions of our model economy. Domestic investment is financed primarily by bank loans and equity
issues. The government provides deposit insurance guarantees to the holders of domestic bank deposits.
Prudential regulation and enforcement is weak leading to rises in the non-performing assets held by banks
and the deposit insurance liability of the government over time. In our model, banks can accumulate non-
performing loans against deposit liabilities when the government guarantees deposits and fails to monitor
additions to bank loan-loss reserves.
In the theoretical model, production displays constant returns to a single accumulable factor, capital, and
issubjecttoidiosyncraticproductivityshocks. Bankfinancingofinvestmentbyfirmsdominatesdirectlend-
ing by savers to firms. Bank loans are derived as constrained optimal contracts under standard information
assumptions. Productivity shocks are independent across a continuum of firms, and there is no aggregate
uncertainty. In equilibrium, the asset portfolios of both banks and households (which hold both deposits and
corporate equities) are perfectly diversified. The analysis focuses on how public sector deposit guarantees
and regulatory forbearance lead to the accumulation of non-performing bank assets, deposit insurance lia-
bilities and falling growth rates in the endogenous growth model. It shows how a banking crisis can evolve
endogenously as investment and output growth decline in the absence of systemic shocks.
Weak prudential regulation is interpreted in our model as a failure of the government to enforce loan-
loss reserve accumulations by banks against non-performing corporate loans or, equivalently, the writing
off of non-performing assets. In this case, banks are able to make dividend payments to their shareholders
against the interest contracted on both performing and non-performing assets. Deposit insurance allows the2
banks to transfer resources from the government to their shareholders. With regulatory forbearance, the
output growth rate falls gradually in equilibrium as non-performing bank loans grow in the economy. The
longer the government fails to intervene, the lower the growth rate falls towards zero. If the government
fails to intervene before a critical date, the banks will be unable to meet the deposit withdrawal demands of
households for consumption leading to a banking crisis. A banking crisis arises endogenously under perfect
foresight in our model.
The dynamics for output, consumption and investment under regulatory forbearance and deposit insur-
ance predicted by the model are compared to the recent experience of the Japanese economy. A feature of
our model is that we can solve for the equity values of the banking sector and the non-bank corporation sec-
tor. A prediction special to our model is that the relative value of bank stocks to the aggregate stock market
falls ahead of a banking crisis, while the value of corporate equity can be rising. The model also predicts a
collapse in the market for collateral at the moment of the crisis. We also compare these implications to the
data for Japan. Our empirical work begins with a test of the maintained hypothesis of perfect foresight. We
compare the experience of Japan to the model and test the relationships in our model using structural vector
autoregressions.
We argue that the data are consistent with our simple dynamic model that assumes that asset prices cor-
rectly reflect fundamentals. We show that for Japan’s recent economic history, fundamentals are important
in explaining Japanese stock returns and that the role of bubbles in affecting stock returns may be small or
superfluous. Surprisingly, we show that these results hold even for the 1980s, when Japanese equity prices
skyrocketed. The data on Japanese macroeconomic aggregates, consumption, investment and growth, are
also roughly consistent with the comparative dynamics of our model.
Given that Japanese stock prices roughly correspond to fundamentals, we test the theoretical prediction
in our model that the ratio of the value of bank equities to the overall stock market declines before the crisis,
and ahead of other macroeconomic aggregates. Our causality tests are consistent with our theory: the ratio
of the value of bank equities to the overall stock market precedes the movement in other macroeconomic
aggregates, for example, the investment-output ratio.
The model of banking crises presented here complements the traditional view of Japan’s banking crisis
in the 1990s. The traditional view places blame for Japan’s banking crisis on the manner of financial sector
deregulation initiated in the middle of the 1970s.1 In that view, as alternative financial instruments were
introduced, large, internationally-oriented firms began to raise funds directly in the domestic and foreign
bond markets. As the large banks started to lose their highest quality corporate borrowers in the late 1980s,
they began lending to smaller firms. When the asset-market boom for Japan in the late 1980s collapsed,3
the Japanese economy began its prolonged stagnation, and the non-performing assets of the banking system
rose rapidly. Despite the rise in direct borrowing by major corporations, Japanese financial intermediation
is dominated by commercial banks. Cargill, Hutchison and Ito [1997] and Cargill [1999] emphasize, as we
do, the importance of explicit and implicit deposit guarantees and of regulatory forbearance in the creation
of the crisis. This paper contributes a formal model of credit market dynamics that complements our earlier
paper, Dekle and Kletzer [2003].2
Our model is one of the few general equilibrium models that analyze the Japanese financial and growth
crisis of the 1990s. Banking crises affect capital accumulation and economic growth, while low growth
rates exacerbate banking crises. Because of the endogenous mutual relationship between banking crises and
growth, partial equilibrium models are severely limited. Three other papers analyze the Japanese economy
in the 1990s using a general equilibrium framework. Hayashi and Prescott [2002] present and calibrate a
real business cycle model for Japan to show how the decrease in labor supply and total factor productivity
growth can account for the growth slump of the 1990s. Hayashi and Prescott argue that credit constraints
were not important for reducing investment rates, but they also suggest that weakness of the banking sector
might have played a role in lowering the productivity of investment. As in our model, Barseghyan [2002]
emphasizes delays in government bailouts of the banking system in an overlapping generations model. In
his model, when the government delays bailouts, banks use new deposits to meet the withdrawals by old
depositors, as in a Ponzi scheme. Barseghyan calibrates his model to Japanese data and finds a favorable
comparisontoJapanesegrowthinthe1990s. Thethirdpaperisourearliermodel(DekleandKletzer[2003])
of endogenous banking crises which presents a somewhat different model and empirical analysis for Japan.
The next section discusses the stylized facts about the Japanese financial system that motivate the simple
assumptions of our analysis. Sections 3, 4 and 5 present the endogenous growth model, analyze the effects
of weak prudential supervision in the presence of deposit insurance and depict how a banking crisis can
occur under perfect foresight, in turn. The next two sections show how our model is consistent with the data
and present some econometric analysis supporting the main implications of our model. Section 8 concludes.
2. Three Characteristics of the Financial System of Japan
ThetheoreticalmodelofthispaperincorporatesthreecharacteristicsoftheJapanesefinancialsysteminto
its assumptions. These assumptions are central to the dynamics of economic growth and domestic financial
markets before and after a banking crisis that are derived in the model. The first is the predominance of
commercial bank intermediation of corporate finance, modeled as arising from the informational advantage4
of banks over other lenders. The second is the prospect of government-provided deposit insurance, or public
sector bailouts of the domestic banking sector. The third is supervisory forbearance and the absence of
effective prudential regulation of the banking sector. In this section, we review these three aspects of the
financial system of Japan to support the use of our assumptions.
2.1 Corporate Reliance on Domestic Bank Borrowing
Post-warJapanprovidesthepictureofabank-centeredfinancialsystem. Untilthemid-1980s,theratioof
bankborrowingtototalcorporate financewas steadyatover80percent. The remainder of corporatefinance
was almost entirely met by issuing new equity. In the mid-1980s, restrictions on the issuing of corporate
bonds were relaxed leading to a rise in domestic and foreign bond financing. By 1995, however, the share
of bank financing in the total was still just under 75 percent. This is a much higher ratio than for the United
States and for developing countries such as Korea, where the ratio was 50 percent in 1997 (see Dekle and
Kletzer, [2002a]).
Typically, only large, well-capitalized firms could raise funds in the bond markets. Small- and medium-
sized domestic firms continued to rely on bank financing (see Hoshi and Kayshap, [2001]). The fraction
of small- and medium-sized business loans to total loans increased from 73 percent over the period, 1977-
86, to 78 percent over the period, 1987-1990, as reported by Ogawa and Kitasaka [2000]. The reliance on
bank financing was especially prevalent for small- and medium-sized firms in the service, construction and
real estate industries. Between 1987-1990, while bank loans to the manufacturing industry increased by 1
percent, loans to the service, construction, and real estate industries increased by 14 percent, 7 percent, and
18 percent, respectively (Ogawa and Kitasaka [2000]).
2.2 Government Explicit and Implicit Guarantees of Domestic Liabilities
Japanese bank deposits have been implicitly guaranteed by the government, traditionally through the
‘‘convoy system’’ or the ‘‘purchase and assumption’’ rescue, in which a healthy bank is encouraged by the
governmenttoprovideassistancetoatroubledone. Recently,however,thegovernmenthasprovidedimplicit
guarantees through direct injections of capital to troubled banks.
In the 1980s, the burden on healthy banks increased, as financially strong banks were asked by the
government to merge with failing banks. For example, in 1986, the large bank Heiwa Sogo failed, after
accumulating a large share of non-performing loans. The government pressured Sumitomo bank, the third
largest private bank, to acquire Heiwa and write off all its bad loans. The write-off of these loans cost
Sumitomo 111 billion yen in 1986 (compared to Sumitomo’s 82 billion yen in profits in 1985) (see Hoshi5
and Kayshap [2001]).
As problem loans mounted in the 1990s, the frequency of convoy rescues rose dramatically, and the
convoy system came to be seen as an arrangement under which stronger banks were forced to bear the cost
of bailing out weaker institutions (Hoshi and Kayshap [2001]). Perhaps the most dramatic of these convoy
rescues was the bailout of Nippon Credit Bank in 1997. Nippon Credit Bank was rendered insolvent by a
huge rise in problem loans that essentially wiped out its capital. The government strongly pressured Nippon
Credit’s creditor banks and insurance companies to swap the debt for shares. The financial institutions
resistedonthebasisthatthesedebt-equityswapswouldweakentheirownfinancialpositions. However,they
relented under strong pressure from the government. In the end, the resistance of the financial institutions
appears to have been justified. Even with the fresh capital, Nippon Credit was not viable, and the bank was
nationalized in December 1998.
The ballooning of problem loans in troubled banks and the low profitability in the banking sector in
general meant that by the mid-1990s, the traditional ‘‘convoy system’’ was no longer workable. Foreign
banks began to charge higher interest rates for interbank loans to Japanese banks, whether weak or strong.
In a departure from the traditional approach, the government resorted to injecting capital directly into the
banks. The first instance of an injection of public capital was in 1995, to seven housing loan companies
(jusens) that were technically insolvent as a result of the collapse of the real estate bubble. Throughout the
1990s, the jusens borrowed heavily from commercial banks and agricultural cooperatives. The collapse of
thejusensmeantthatthelenderbanksandagriculturalcooperatives,alreadyweakenedbytheirownproblem
loans, would face further financial difficulties. The write-off combined aspects of the ‘‘convoy system’’ and
the new approach of injecting public capital. The lender banks and agricultural cooperatives contributed
about 40 percent to the write-offs, while public funds covered the remaining 60 percent (Ito [2000]).
As banking problems worsened, the frequency of public capital injections increased. In late 1998, the
governmentinjectedcapitalbynationalizingandrecapitalizingthemosttroubledofthemajorbanks,Nippon
Credit Bank and Long-term Credit Bank.3 Subsequently, the injection of public capital took the form of the
almost indiscriminate recapitalization of all the major banks. The government sought to recapitalize all of
the major banks due to concerns that all the banks were sufficiently weak and that discriminating among
banks would cause depositors to flee from the weaker banks. To this end, in late 1999, the government set
aside 43 trillion yen for the nationalization and recapitalization of the banks (9 percent of GDP), and all but
one major bank and some of the weaker smaller (regional) banks were recapitalized.
In 2003, injections of public money resumed. In May 2003, the government injected $18 billion into
Resona, Japan’s fifth largest bank, because the bank’s capital adequacy ratio dipped below 4 percent, the6
necessary level for domestic operations. In November 2003, the government nationalized Ashikaga bank, a
major regional bank, but only one-eighth the size of Resona.
The main difference between an injection of public money and a nationalization, is that in the case of
nationalization, the management are removed, thus, mitigating somewhat, the moral hazard. However, even
in the case of the injection of public money to buy bank equity, the bank equity are scheduled to convert to
voting shares in 2004, unless the bank runs a profit.
With regards to explicit guarantees, formal deposit insurance existed in Japan since 1971, but the sys-
tem was understaffed and underfunded. Following the turmoil in the banking sector in the mid-1990s, the
government sharply increased the capitalization of the deposit insurance system, explicitly guaranteeing de-
posits up to 10 million yen (about 100 thousand dollars). Since larger deposits were not guaranteed, the
government in early 1998 issued an explicit ‘‘blanket guarantee’’ of all bank deposits, regardless of size,
until April 2003, to preempt an outflow of large deposits from the weaker banks. The government recently
extended these ‘‘blanket guarantees’’ until March 2005.
Thegovernment’ssystemofexplicitandimplicitguaranteesimpliesthatnodeposits, largeorsmall, were
ever at risk in postwar Japan. Prior to 1991, the official policy was there would be ‘‘no failures of financial
institutions.’’ Since 1991, banks have failed; for example, from 1991 to 1995, eleven small banks were
formally declared insolvent. However, the guarantees meant that no depositor ever lost any funds.
2.3 Government Prudential Regulations and Enforcement
In our model, the failure of authorities tomonitor the accumulation of non-performing assets and holding
of loan-loss reserves by banks until the deposit insurance liability of the government has reached either a
critical level leads to financial crises and falling GDP growth. Until the late 1990s, the main responsibility
for setting up and enforcing the prudential regulations of the banking sector rested with the Banking Bureau
of the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Examiners from the Bureau would visit all of the major banks once a
year, and regional banks once every three years, and classify the loans according the examiners perception
of collectability. Banks with an increasing amount of irrecoverable loans were put on notice, and if matters
did not improve, mergers would be arranged with a stronger bank. All was done very quietly, and behind
the scenes.
This system of prudential supervision left wide discretion to the bank examiners and their supervisors in
the Banking Bureau. Moreover, many high officials of the Banking Bureau retired into executive positions
at commercial banks, where they maintained close contact with and influence over the Ministry of Finance
(the amakudari system). The relationshipalsoincludedlavishentertainmentofbankexaminersbythebanks7
(Grimes [2001]). Supervisory forbearance seems likely in this regulatory environment.
Awareness of the problems with the existing bank supervisory regime led the government to move finan-
cialsupervisionandexaminationfromtheMinistryofFinancetothenewindependentFinancialSupervisory
Agency in 1996. The government also tried to replace discretion of supervisors by a rule-based scheme, the
Prompt Corrective Action system, in 1998. Under Prompt Corrective Action, regulators are required to
intervene quickly at poorly capitalized banks. For example, regulators are required to close a bank if the
bank’s capital-asset ratio falls below zero.
Initially, these institutional changes led to improvements in prudential supervision and enforcement. The
Financial Supervisory Agency moved to examine the books of all banks which led to the immediate closure
of five smaller banks. However, as the immediate financial crisis subsided, the regulations were redefined
to make them less restrictive. The introduction of the Prompt Corrective Action policy was delayed a year.
Accounting standards were changed, so that banks could make their financial statements appear better than
they were. Some banks that should have been closed under the statutes were allowed to continue operating
because the closure of these banks would add to local unemployment.
In sum, the newly established Financial Supervisory Agency appears to be somewhat lax in the assess-
ment of the loan assets of banks. This is mainly because the severe assessment of loans is likely to lead the
banks to abandon firms in distress, bankruptcies, and high unemployment.
3. A Model of Growth and Banking Crises
This section presents a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth with bank-intermediated in-
vestment to show how publicly-funded deposit insurance and prudential supervisory or regulatory failures
combine to affect investment and output growth. The model differs from our earlier model, Dekle and Klet-
zer [2003] in a number of respects. There are two important innovations in this paper. The first is that we
use an open economy with a banking sector that faces competition for deposits at a given real rate of inter-
est. The second is the production structure. Together these lead to a significant qualitative difference in the
dynamics leading up to a bank liquidity crisis.
3.1 Production and Bank Lending
Output is produced from capital alone using a constant returns to scale technology with stochastic pro-
ductivity. There is a continuum of firms, indexed across the unit interval, and productivity shocks are in-
dependent and identically distributed across firms and over time for each firm. The net output for a typical8














t denote output, the capital stock and the realized net productivity for firmj at time
t, respectively. There is no depreciation for simplicity, and investment is assumed to be irreversible (this
assumption is used later). For simplicity, productivity realizations, αt, are distributed uniformly over the






where yt and kt denote aggregate net output and the capital stock at time t, respectively.
Savingsisundertakenbyacontinuumofhouseholdswhoacquirebankdepositsandholdequitiesinfirms
and banks. All households are identical and infinitely-lived, so that there is no trade in firm or bank equity
in equilibrium. Capital accumulation is debt-financed, and any firm income net of interest is immediately
paid in dividends to firm shareholders. A standard informational asymmetry motivates the predominance of
bank lending over direct lending by households and generates conventional loan contracts. Firms observe
their productivities in each period at no cost, but lenders can only observe it at a positive cost. Banks are
able to make these observations at a lower cost than households so all lending is intermediated by banks in
equilibrium. Townsend [1979] and Diamond [1984] show that the standard loan contract is optimal in this
context (in a static setting).4 For algebraic simplicity, the costs of observing a corporate borrower’s output
is proportional to firm’s capital (for example, auditing costs rise with firm size).
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t is the loan rate of interest, r is the deposit rate of interest, γ represents auditing costs and  t is the
size of the loan. Under our assumptions, if a firm has no accumulated unpaid past net interest, the firm’s
debt,  t, just equals its capital stock, kt. The equilibrium rate of interest, r , charged to a single-period loan













With positive probability, r3
α, the earnings of the firm will fall short of the net interest on the loan in period
t. The loss to the bank is accounted for by the interest rate spread, r  − r,i ne q u a t i o n( 2 ) .
The interest rate that maximizes a lender’s expected return in this economy is α− γ (per unit of firm
capital). The interest charged can reach this level if banks rollover unpaid interest obligations into longer
term loans increasing interest charges as a share of firm revenues. Under perfect competition, the initial9
interest rate charged to firms would be less than r . However, rolling over unpaid interest in this economy
increases the future probability that firm revenues will be less than interest costs. This means that the
probability that banks bear and pass on intermediation costs, γk, rises with rollovers. Therefore, in present
value, intermediation costs are minimized under single-period contracts.5 Since these are deadweight costs
(passed on to firms in interest with competitive banking), short-term contracts charging an interest rate
equal to r  are efficient in this economy. Additional institutional assumptions could be made to get long-
term contracts, but the only effect on the balanced growth path of this economy would be quantitative, the
interest rate would be α− γ rather than r . We use the constrained optimal contract for this standard model.
The aggregate dynamics of the economy are easy to analyze because there is no aggregate uncertainty
with a continuum of firms. The portfolio of each of a finite number of banks is fully diversified with the
continuum of firms drawing productivity realizations from independent and identical distributions. In the







kt, and the capital stock evolves
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which is paid in dividends to households for holding shares of corporate equities.
3.2 Household Consumption and Saving








with respect to its consumption plan given its flow budget identity,
˙ a = rat + dt + xt − ct,
the conventional solvency constraint,
lim
s→∞e−r(s−t)as ≥ 0,
andinitialdepositholdings, at. xt representsbankdividends. Thenumberoffirmsandbanksisfixedsothat
equity shares cannot be accumulated in the aggregate, hence by the representative household in equilibrium.
Households completely avoid any corporate dividend income risk by holding a fully diversified portfolio
of corporate stocks with a continuum of firms realizing independent productivity shocks. In equilibrium at
each date, a proportion (1 − r /α) of each bank’s loans pay interest r  per unit of capital, and a proportion10
r /α pay average interest 1
2αr 2. In addition, the flow cost of bank intermediation is equal to the current
auditing costs, (r /α)γkt.
The assumptions that allow complete diversification of productivity risk by households as shareholders
and depositors allow us to show how inadequate bank monitoring and prudential regulation with deposit
insurance affect investment, output growth and asset prices. Incomplete risk diversification opportunities or
incentives, as emphasized in the agency models proposed by Dekle and Kletzer [2002a and b] could raise
the social costs created by inadequate supervision and regulation of intermediaries or firms.6
3.3 Benchmark Equilibrium
We take the case in which the government requires banks to hold reserves against any loan losses they
accumulate and enforces this regulation continuously as a benchmark. In equilibrium, the losses of banks












are offset by surpluses on a proportion (α − r )/α given by
α − r 
α

r  − r

kt.
With continuous loan-loss reserving enforced, the banks’ profits on some loans just match write-offs on
other loans. The profits of each bank are always zero, and the value of bank equity is always zero. The
government accumulates no liabilities associated with deposit insurance or other guarantees to the banking
system, implicit or explicit.
The equilibrium path for the economy is found by maximizing representative household utility with
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The growth rate remains constant over the entire infinite horizon. In this case, net household savings just11




kt = ˙ kt. (6)
Imposing the assumption that r>ρ allows positive investment and output growth. Note that the gross







Bank deposits, a, grow at the same rate as output,
r−ρ
σ .
The aggregate value of corporate equity is given by the present value of dividends, discounted at the























which rises proportionally with the capital stock and output.
4. Growth with Deposit Guarantees and Regulatory Forbearance
Toanalyzetheeffectsofweakprudentialsupervisioninthepresenceofpubliclyfundeddepositinsurance,
we assume that government regulators do not enforce loan loss reserve requirements. They do not audit the
balance sheets of the banks and require reserving against accumulated losses on individual loans. This
allows banks to keep uncollected interest on their balance sheets as performing assets without using the
profits earned on other loans to cover the losses. By doing so, the banks can pay dividends from current
loan profits without subtracting current loan losses.
If the liability of shareholders to the holders of bank deposits is limited, banks have an incentive to
accumulate non-performing assets and pay out dividends from current loan income. When a bank becomes
insolvent, shareholders are spared from liability so that the value of shareholder equity is bounded from
below by zero. As a bank accumulates losses as non-performing loans without also saving the surplus,
r −r, fromrepaidloans, theselosseswillbeborneeventuallybyshareholders, depositorsorthegovernment
through a depositor bailout. If depositors bear the cost and cannot monitor the bank’s accounts7,t h e nt h e
rate of interest received by depositors will be driven down and the growth rate of the economy declines.
In our case, the government provides deposit insurance but does not audit the bank loan portfolios or
monitor loan-loss reserves. By accumulating non-performing assets and paying dividends equal to the loan
income from performing assets, a bank accumulates a deposit insurance claim against the government. The
liabilitiesofthebankingsystemequalthetotaldepositsofsavers,anditsassetsequalthesumofthecorporate
sector capital stock and the total deposit insurance claim against the government. That is, the accumulated
loanlossesare assets, but theyare claims againstthe government’sdepositinsurance planratherthanagainst12
the corporate sector. The deposit insurance liability of the government is a public debt held by the banks.
The assets of the banking sector, which are equal to its deposit liabilities, are the sum of kt and government
debt, bt. Total household interest-bearing assets equal bank deposits, so that at = kt + bt in equilibrium.
The deposit insurance claim of the banks against deposits contrasts with bonds or other forms of public debt
issued by the treasury. The deposit insurance liability of the government is created endogenously by the
banking sector.
So that banks pay positive dividends in equilibrium, some form of imperfect competition in banking
needs to be introduced. This model does not require us to be very articulate about imperfect competition.
For simplicity, we let banks compete in individual initial loans but pay out dividends against individual loan
profits and accumulate deposit insurance claims against accumulated individual loan losses with a fixed
number of banks. The loan rate of interest is r  as defined by equation (2). If banks did compete away
any profits by offering lower interest rates to the corporate sector, the deposit insurance liability of the
government will finance dividends to corporate shareholders in exactly the same amount as will go to the
bank shareholders here. Since all shares are held by the representative household, nothing but the division
between bank dividends and corporate dividends is affected by our assumption.
Weconsidertwosimpleinstitutionalconstraintsontheflowofdividendsthatabankcanpayateachdate.
One is that if the bank cannot meet its net withdrawal demand at any time, it is illiquid and the government
immediatelyintervenes. Thesecondconstraintis thatbanks cannotaccumulate non-performingassetsfaster









in the aggregate. This is the same as loan profits minus the costs of intermediation given by
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Total dividends paid to bank equities will equal this amount in equilibrium until regulatory authorities stop
allowing thepublicsectordeposit insuranceliabilitytogrow. Depositinsuranceisasubsidytoshareholders,
and banks maximize the value of shareholder equity under limited shareholder liability by making these
lump-sum transfers as fast as possible. In this economy, bank dividends are a transfer from the public
sectortobankshareholders. Theadditionalinstitutionalassumptionisthatbankscannotclaimlargerdeposit
insurance losses than the deposit cost of accumulated unpaid interest on corporate loans.
We first allow banks to accumulate losses for a fixed period of time, from t =0to T. At time T,
the government intervenes and stops further accumulation of non-performing loans by the banks. Public
sector liabilities, bT are determined in equilibrium given T, or conversely. The analysis is the same if the13










grow with the capital stock until date T. The capital stock grows as the difference between bank deposits
and the deposit insurance claim of the banks. The deposit insurance liability of the public sector grows as
˙ b = rbt + xt, (10)
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. The value of bank equity evolves according to
˙ V b = rV b
t − xt. (11)
At time T, dividends drop permanently to zero, so that V b must converge to zero at time T. Initially, deposit
insurance liabilities (equivalently, non-performing loans) are zero, so that b0 =0 . The sum of the public
sector liability and banking sector equity, b + V b,g r o w sa s






for 0 ≤ t ≤ T. For this period, the government does not recognize or cover its deposit guarantee liabilities.
The solvency constraint for the public sector implies that after time T, the government must collect
revenue to meet its obligation, bT. In this economy, the government does not have access to lump-sum taxes
and imposes a tax on interest income (the interest received on deposits) at a constant proportionate rate, τ.
The deposit rate of interest from time T on is e r =( 1− τ)r. The flow-budget identity for the public sector
from T onward is
˙ b = rbt − τr(kt + bt)=e rbt − τrkt, (13)






τrkte−e r(t−T)dt = e−rTbT + e−rT
] ∞
T
τrkte−e r(t−T)dt =0 . (14)
To simplify the mathematics only, τ is taken to be constant. For the same reason, τ is chosen so that the
government is solvent and the ratio of government liabilities to deposits stays constant. This keeps the
post-tax rate of interest, e r, and the ratio b/k constant for t ≥ T.
The equilibrium growth path is derived assuming perfect foresight. That is, households correctly antic-
ipate the future tax on interest earnings imposed at time T. The flow-budget identity for the representative
household is given by
˙ k + ˙ b = r(kt + bt)+xt + dt − ct, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (15)14
and
˙ k + ˙ b = e r(kt + bt)+dt − ct, for t ≥ T. (16)
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kt, for t ≥ T. (20)
Consumption as a share of the capital stock rises monotonically, while the national savings rate falls, over
time up to date T.
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e r − ρ
σ
, for t ≥ T. (22)
The function, ϕ(T − t,τ), is decreasing in t for t ≤ T, equals
e r−ρ
σ for t = T and converges to
r−ρ
σ as T −t
goestoinfinity. Underperfectforesight, theinvestmentrateandgrowthrateofoutputfallasnon-performing
bank assets rise. The constraint that banks must remain liquid before date T is not binding if e r−ρ > 0.8 In
the next subsection, we consider the possibility that this inequality does not hold.
To calculate the value of bank equity, recall that shareholder value is maximized if banks pay out the
largest possible dividends up to time T,





kt. The stockmarket value of the banking sector






















Differentiation of equation (23) shows that the ratio of bank equity to the current capital stock,
V b
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(α/2−(r3/α)γ)kt, falls monotonically to zero up to time T. The total value of bank

























































After date T, the value of corporate equity grows at the same rate as the capital stock and output,
e r−ρ
σ .U p
to time T, it also grows proportionately with kt and output if σ =1 , but grows faster than kt if σ > 1
a n dm o r es l o w l yt h a nkt if σ < 1. Thus, for an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of one-half (σ =2 ),
typically assumed in calibrated growth models, the value of corporate equity rises faster than gross domestic
output up to time T.9 Although the value of corporate equity is continuous at T under perfect foresight, the
growth rate of corporate equity suddenly falls at time T to
e r−ρ
σ for σ > 1. This is verified by differentiating
equation (25).
The model predicts that the value of bank equity will fall in proportion to gross domestic output before
thegovernmentrealizesitsdepositinsurancelossesinthebankingsector. Thevalueofcorporateequityrises
faster than output before time T, and grows with gross domestic output thereafter. A decline in the value
of bank equities foreshadows the banking crisis, but a decline in corporate equity does not under perfect
foresight.
5. A Banking Crisis under Perfect Foresight
Inthemodeleconomy, banksaccumulateclaimsagainstthegovernmentintheformofunrealizeddeposit
insurance liabilities as they accumulate non-performing loans without offsetting loan-loss reserves on their
balance sheets. These public sector liabilities held by the banks balance the difference between their total
liabilities to depositors and the real assets (capital) of corporate debtors. In paying dividends from what
would otherwise be additions to loan-loss reserves, banks create transfer payments from the government to
theshareholders. Eventually, thegovernmentmustraisetaxrevenuetopayforthesetransfersanddoessoby
taxing depositors. The transfers are possible because the public sector guarantees deposits, either explicitly16
or implicitly, without adequately monitoring and controlling the growth of its deposit guarantee indemnity
or the accumulation of non-performing loans by banks with positive equity values.10
Aninterpretationofthegovernment’spolicyisthatthegovernmentforebearsregulationandenforcement
until its insurance liability reaches some threshold (bT). To an extent this characterizes the policies followed
by many governments that have subsequently faced banking crises. It is clearly not an optimal policy if
monitoring is costless. In the model economy, banks can meet household deposit withdrawal demand, given
by equation (19), as long as e r ≥ ρ. The longer it takes the government to stop the growth of its deposit
insurance liabilities, the larger is its debt when it finally does intervene and begins to finance its insurance
losses by taxing interest. The longer regulatory authorities forebear (that is, the larger is T), the lower will
the rate of investment and the growth rate of output be after time T.















This can be rewritten using the solution for e−rTbT from integrating the growth equation for the govern-





















The solvency constraint becomes
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where e r =( 1− τ)r. Total differentiation with respect to T and τ shows that τ, and public debt, bT,a r e







e r − ρ
σ
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falls as the tax rate rises.
For a long enough period of regulatory forbearance, public debt will rise sufficiently so that the tax
rate must be raised to the point that the post-tax interest rate on deposits falls below the subjective rate
of discount and the long-run equilibrium growth rate is negative. In this case, household savings will be
negative, and households will withdraw deposits on net from the banking system. These net withdrawals
will force the banks to reduce lending to corporations forcing corporations to scrap capital. Our assumption17
that investment is irreversible (as an extreme case of downward investment adjustment costs) imposes an
upper bound on τ, and therefore on T.
The growth rate of the economy given by equation (21) falls continuously until time T to its long-run
level given by
r(1−τ)−ρ
σ .I fr(1 − τ) < ρ, then the growth rate falls to zero at some time T before date T .
At date T, the banking system will able to just meet the withdrawal demands of depositors using the interest







The growth of deposits, the capital stock and gross domestic output all reach zero at time T. If the deposit
insurance liability of the government continues to rise after the growth rate reaches zero at time T,t h e
anticipated tax rate on interest must also rise. In this economy (in contrast that in Dekle and Kletzer [2003]),
the pre-tax deposit rate of interest can rise. Bank returns on loans are maximized when the loan rate of






Corporate profits fall to
d∗ =












where k is constant since the growth rate is zero. The social costs of intermediation also rise toγ (α − γ)/α
so that total dividends that are paid out under regulatory forbearance decline. As the pre-tax rate of interest,
however, the post-tax rate of interest must remain equal to the discount rate, ρ. At time e T, the interest rate
reaches r∗ with a tax rate given by r∗ (1 − τ∗)=ρ. The deposit insurance liability of the government
reaches b∗, determined by the tax rate τ∗.
After e T, banks will only be able to meet the withdrawal demands of depositors by reducing outstanding
loans to corporate borrowers. This requires the repayment of loan principal by firms. The entire banking
system faces net withdrawal demand at e T in equilibrium, so that no firm would be able to reduce its debt
to one bank by borrowing from another. An existing or new firm could not buy all or part of the firm’s
capital either, since it would not be able to get a loan from a bank to finance its purchase. In this economy,
banks become illiquid at time e T because they have no alternative but to face net withdrawals of deposits that
cannot be met. A banking crisis must occur, and the government must stop accumulating deposit insurance
liabilities.
The capital stock employed by firms can be interpreted as loan collateral in this economy. Prior to the18
onset of the crisis, one firm can sell its capital to another and repay its loans fully. This makes a market for
collateral with an equilibrium price of collateral equal to one. In a crisis, a bank that attempts to reduce its
corporate loans to meet deposit withdrawals would discover that its borrowers are unable to repay their loan
principals. If banks foreclose loans in the amount of net withdrawal demand by depositors, the collateral on
those loans will have a zero price. This is because no firm will be able to borrow to purchase the collateral.
The financing is not available because aggregate bank deposits have decreased by exactly the amount of the
foreclosed loans. Loans are not available to potential purchasers of the seized collateral in equilibrium with
irreversible investment. There will be no demand for collateral at a positive price in the crisis even though
the marginal productivity of capital is positive.
This implies a collapse in the market for collateral in a banking crisis. If banks are heterogenous and
become liquidity constrained idiosyncratically, then a decline in the value of collateral (that is, a decrease in
Tobin’s q) could result. Bank heterogeneity could be introduced to the model economy by adding assump-
tions that lead banks to incomplete diversify their loan portfolios in equilibrium (for example, allowing a
finite number of firms and increasing returns to scale in banking). This would make the deposit insurance
liability and current earnings of each bank depend on the particular history of productivity shocks for its
corporate clients. Over time, some banks will earn less from lending than others and might eventually be
unable to meet the withdrawal demands of depositors from their net earnings on loans. Banks that do well
can acquire borrowers as banks that do poorly shrink.
However, in the presence of deposit insurance with regulatory forbearance, banks that do well pay out
dividends to shareholders only over a finite horizon just as in our model of homogeneous banks. New loans
generate future dividends for shareholders only until the accumulation of deposit insurance liabilities by the
government stops. Therefore, we should expect that the value of collateral will fall as more and more banks
become insolvent up to the onset of a banking crisis or the end of regulatory forbearance (the interpretation
of what happens if T is less that e T). Alternatively, with continuously enforced loan-loss reserves, the price
of collateral, q, would remain equal to one in this economy.
For many years, the Government of Japan dealt with the problem of troubled banks through the ‘‘convoy
system,’’ under which weak banks would be merged with strong banks. Under the convoy system the losses
ofaweakbankareabsorbedbytheshareholdersofthestrongbank. Aninterpretationisthattheshareholders
of a strong bank absorb the equivalent of the deposit insurance liability in these forced mergers. In this
interpretation of the convoy system, the dividends paid to the shareholders of the weak bank are eventually
financed by transfers from the shareholders of the strong bank rather than from taxpayers.
This interpretation also suggests that the convoy system should break down. The managers of the strong19
banks face the same incentives to accumulate deposit insurance claims as do the shareholders of the weak
banks. In a heterogeneous economy, their loan portfolios performed well ex post, so that their net asset
incomes are higher those that of weaker banks, but the convoy system taxes the higher returns to pay for
(past)dividends paidtothe shareholders ofthe weaker banks. It transfers equityfromthe owners of stronger
banks to weaker banks in expectation. When a bank becomes a convoy leader, its shareholder value falls.
Therefore, the maximization of shareholder returns implies that a bank should avoid becoming a convoy
leader by paying out all the dividends it can over the same horizon as the rest of the banking sector.
In the fiscal policy adopted in our discussion of the analytical model, the tax rate, τ, was constant after
date T. This kept the public debt to output ratio constant. Alternative fiscal policies under which the
government delays raising revenue or adopts a time-varying tax rate could also be used. For example,
regulatory authorities could intervene in the banking system at time T  with public sector deposit insurance
liability equal to bT 3, and fiscal authorities could wait to raise taxes until time e T. The tax rate imposed
at time e T will need to be sufficient to service the accumulated public debt er(e T−T 3)bT 3. With irreversible
investment,thegrowthrategoestozeroattime e T ifthetaxrateimpliedbythisdebtlevelreducesthepost-tax
rate of return to deposits to the household discount rate. Other possible policy responses include imposing
taxes so that b stays constant as the economy grows or b is reduced to zero over some finite horizon. In
these cases, the tax rate varies over time. If the deposit insurance liability declines in proportion to output,
then the tax rate falls over time and the growth rate of output will rise again. Under these types of fiscal
responses, our model would imply a temporary, perhaps sharp, fall in the growth rate of gross domestic
output, followed by a recovery.
6. Empirical Tests of Asset Prices and Fundamentals
Before we apply our model to the Japanese experience, we first test whether asset prices correctly re-
flect economic fundamentals. This is because our model imposes perfect foresight, ruling out bubbles and
implying that all asset prices reflect fundamentals. The stock market values of corporations (25), and of the
banking sector (24) are assumed to equal the present discounted value of dividends. The deposit insurance
liability of the government depends on the growth of stock market values (13), and since the flow-budget
identity for the representative household depends on this deposit insurance liability (government debt), the
behavior of consumption and other real variables in our model depends on the assumption that stock prices
reflectfundamentalvalues. Thus,itisimportanttoascertainwhetherbubblesexist,andwhetherstockvalues
reflect fundamentals. Here we perform some tests, showing that for Japan’s recent history, our assumption20
that asset prices reflect fundamentals is basically correct.
Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay ([1997], p. 260) and others argue thatbubbles in stock pricesare inconsis-
tent with stationary stock returns if the dividend process follows a linear process with a unit root. They also
show that prices and dividends, and prices and earnings should be cointegrated. In fact, rational bubbles in
stockpricesmayimplythattheseriesofstockprices, stockreturns, dividend-priceratios, andearnings-price
ratios follow an explosive process, in which the series keep on increasing to infinity (See Appendix).
6.1 Unit Root Tests for Bubbles in Stock Prices, Dividends, and Earnings
The validity of these stationarity relationships can be seen in Figures 1-3, and in Table 1. Although the
relations in equations (1)-(3) are expressed in terms of levels, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay ([1997], p.
261) show that they are also valid in terms in logs, if dividends follow a loglinear process. From Figures
1-3, we can see that log stock price changes look like a stationary series. This is corroborated in the Phillips-
Perron unit root tests of Table 1, which shows, for all periods, a rejection of the hypothesis that log stock
price changes are nonstationary.
If log prices and log dividends are cointegrated, then the log dividend-price ratio should be stationary.
From Figure 1, however, the log dividend-price ratio looks like a non-stationary series. Phillips-Perron unit
root tests show that for the 1980Q2-2002Q2, and 1991Q1-2002Q2 periods, we can reject the null hypothesis
ofnonstationarityatthe10percentlevel, althoughforthe1980Q2-1990Q4period, wecannotrejectthenull-
hypothesis of nonstationarity.
Similarly, from Figure 2, the log price-earnings ratios looks like a non-stationary series. Phillips-Perron
unit root tests show that for all periods, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the log price-earnings ratio is
nonstationary.
Finally, since short-term interest rates are used to discount future dividends, we examine the behavior of
short-term interest rates (the call rate) in Figure 3. Short-term interest rates appear to be stationary until the
end of 1991. Clearly, since 1992, short-term interest rates appear non-stationary.
Overall, these results suggest that while the evidence for the existence of bubbles is not compelling, we
cannot entirely reject the existence of bubbles, especially in the 1980Q2-1990Q4 period, when there is no
cointegration between stock prices and dividends or earnings. However, the balance of evidence suggests
that our fundamentals assumption is reasonable.
6.2 Fundamentals, Bubbles, and the Predictability of Stock Returns
If stock returns are predictable from fundamentals, then bubbles, even if they exist, are small, and are21
probably not important in affecting stock returns. Table 2 shows some long-horizon regressions, relating
stock returns on various fundamentals at horizons of 1 quarter, 4 quarters (1 year), and 12 quarters (3 years).
The fundamentals we examine are the log price-earnings ratio, the log dividend-price ratio, and the short-
term interest rate. As it is well-known, forecast accuracy increases remarkably as the horizon increases.
The coefficients, R-squareds, and T-statistics all increase, as the forecast horizon increases. For example, as
the current log price-earnings ratio increases, stocks become overvalued and this overvaluation is corrected
after 4 quarters or so. That is, high log price-earnings ratios imply low stock returns, at medium to long
horizons. The coefficients on the log-price earnings ratios are negative. A high current log dividend-price
ratioimpliesincreasingstockreturns. Finally,highcurrentshort-terminterestratespredicthighstockreturns
at long-horizons.11
Table 3 depicts the relationship between fundamentals and stock returns in a V AR framework. It appears
that some fundamentals have explanatory power, over and beyond lagged stock returns. Both the dividend-
price and the price-earnings ratios have high explanatory power. The moderately high R-squared values
suggests a modest degree of forecastability for quarterly stock returns. In the last column of Table 3, we
added first-differences of the variables that are included in our V ector Autoregression estimates in Section
7. The first difference of lagged credit (actually, the credit-GDP ratio) is highly significant, although none
of the other variables are significant. The R-squared value of 0.29 again suggests a moderate degree of
forecastability.
Overall,theseresultssuggestthatfundamentalshavegoodforecastingpower,especiallyatlong-horizons.
Furthermore, fundamentals appear to have forecasting power, over and beyond lagged stock returns. These
results suggest that fundamentals are important in explaining Japanese stock returns, and that the role of
bubbles in affecting stock returns, may be small or superfluous.
7. Application of the Model to the Japanese Economy in the 1990s
In the theoretical model, a banking crisis and growth collapse develops endogenously in the absence of
effective prudential regulation in an economy without aggregate production risk and under perfect foresight.
Idiosyncratic production risk across firms creates individual loan losses that can be exactly offset by profits
on other loans but are not when banks are able to pay out dividends against deposit insurance liabilities
subsidized by the government. We argue that the practice of prudential supervision and regulation in Japan
over the last two decades matches our assumptions very well. In this section, we consider how well the
predictions of the model fit Japanese economic performance.22
The model predicts dynamics for investment, consumption, output, bank credit growth, asset prices and
the value of collateral assets before and after the crisis that can be compared to the data. Some empirical
implications of the model are:
1. As the banking systemaccumulates a depositinsurance claiminthe formof non-performingcorporate
loans against which dividends were paid, the growth rate of output decreases steadily to its post-crisis level
and consumption rises as a share of output under perfect foresight.
2. The stockmarket value of the corporate sector can grow more rapidly than output before the crisis is
realized for the empirical plausible case of inelastic intertemporal substitution (σ > 1).
3. The stockmarket value of the banking sector will decline before the crisis, implying that we should
observe a decrease in the value of bank stocks relative to the aggregate value of the stock market before the
banking crisis.12
4. The value of collateral in the model equals qtkt which grows proportionately with output until output
growth falls to zero in a banking crisis and the market for collateral collapses.13
Two of the many simplifying assumptions of the model are important to reconsider for comparing its
equilibriumdynamics tothe empiricalrecordforJapan. The first is the assumption of fullinformationunder
perfect foresight. In equilibrium, the output share of investment decreases gradually to its long-run value
and consumption rises steadily to its long-run share before the banking crisis. Households and firms may be
imperfectlyinformedandreceiveinformationovertimeaboutthehealthofthebankingsectororfuturefiscal
policies under rational expectations. When there is news about bank balance sheets or the government’s
expectedresponsetodepositinsurancelosses,investmentandGDPgrowthcanchangesuddenly. Thesecond
issue is that aggregate productivity for Japan fluctuates. A temporary adverse aggregate productivity shock
would lead to a permanent rise in non-performing loans held by the bank sector, moving the beginning of
a crisis forward in the model economy. Therefore, such a shock would have a permanent effect on GDP
growth under rational expectations.
It is difficult to identify the beginning of the banking crisis in Japan. At least two dates can be sug-
gested readily. In 1992, the Japanese Ministry of Finance first acknowledged rising non-performing bank
loans publicly. This followed the beginning of the sharp deterioration of Japanese economic performance in
the early 1990s. The second possibility is 1997 to early 1998, when several financial institutions, including
banks (Nippon Credit Bank and Hokkaido Takushoku)andmajor securities companies (Sanyo andY amaichi
securities) collapsed. At the same time, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 provided a major inter-
national shock to the Japanese economy. In the interpretation of the model, either or both of these dates
may be times that households and firms receive news about problems in the banking sector. The realization23
that banks have large and growing non-performing assets in the early 1990s could reveal information that
starts investment and output growth on the adjustment path predicted by the model as the banking sector
deteriorates further. The accumulation of deposit insurance losses may not have ended yet, so that date T in
the model may not have been reached. Therefore, we need to remain agnostic about the timing of the onset
of the banking crisis.
7.1 Output growth, consumption and investment
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4 (from Dekle and Kletzer [2003]) shows a significant decline in the GDP growth rate for Japan over the
three years, 1990 through 1992. Although we cannot make a judgement about when the future costs of
bank bailouts were recognized by investors and savers, but the decline in the growth rate to lower levels that
persist (and worsen) to the present is consistent with the model.
The growth rate of consumption does not fall before the 1990s, but begins to decline as the GDP growth
rate fell in 1990. Figure 4 also shows a slight rise in consumption as a share of GDP beginning in 1990. This
is also consistent with the model because consumption growth does not fall as much as output growth does.
In response to economic performance, the government of Japan increased transfer payments to households
in the 1990s. This could contribute to a smaller contraction in household consumption as a share of GDP
and may helped sustain consumption growth. Hayashi and Prescott [2002] argue that regulatory changes in
the 1980s reduced the incentives of households to supply labor, leading to a rise in leisure consumption by
about 20 percent. If consumption of goods and leisure are complements, then these changes could raise the
share of consumption in output.
Figure 4 also shows that investment growth does not decline before 1990 as it would if savers and in-
vestorsanticipatedthegrowthinnon-performingbankloansandpublicsectorliabilitiesthatwouldberecog-
nizedintheearly1990s. ThefigureshowsadeclineintheshareofinvestmentinGDPafter1990aspredicted
by our model. These data are consistent with the interpretation that the news of the impending banking cri-
sis arrives after the end of the 1980s. Indeed, the share of investment in GDP rises in the late 1980s before
the onset of the Japanese growth collapse. Our basic model does not imply these dynamics, but a rise in
investment share is implied by our agency model (Dekle and Kletzer [2002a and b]. That model suggests
that extending our current model by allowing adverse selection in investment projects by firms could lead
to an increase in the growth rate of the capital stock before a crisis.
A drop in investment may be reflected in investment in research and development or the adoption of
technological innovations and be under estimated by the rate of capital accumulation. Investment in new24
technologies may generate returns over longer average horizons than aggregate capital formation. In Japan,
between 1970-80 and 1990-98, total factor productivity (TFP) growth rates dropped from 1.1 percent per
annum to 0.2 percent per annum. The decline in TFP was especially sharp in manufacturing, where TFP
growth dropped from 4.9 percent to 0.5 percent per annum. With regards to other measures of productivity,
returnonequityfell from12percent in1980to4percentin1998; andthereturnoninvestedcapitalfellfrom
6 percent in 1980 to 4 percent in 1998. These compare with 1998 returns on equity and invested capital in
the United States of 22 percent and 14 percent respectively.14
7.2 Bank credit growth
Total bank credit in the model equals the sum of firm capital stocks and the deposit insurance claims
accumulated by banks, k + b. This sum equals the total bank deposits held by households and grow as a
share of GDP up to the crisis. Bank credit as a share of GDP should stop rising when a banking crisis occurs
and should decline if the deposit insurance liabilities of the government are expected to be cleared in finite
time. Figure 5 shows that these dynamics correspond roughly to the data for Japan and that there is a distinct
change in the growth rate for the ratio of bank credit to GDP in 1991. This is consistent with our dating of
the beginning of the banking crisis in the early 1990s followed by a deepening of the crisis in 1997-98.
7.3 Non-performing bank loans and land prices
An important implication of the model is that the stock market value of domestic banks should be declin-
inguptotimeT. ThestockmarketvalueofthecorporationsectoralsogrowsfasterthanGDPinequilibrium
before the crisis and drop to the growth rate of GDP after the crisis in the model. Because the collapse of
the Nikkei bubble of the 1980s would also cause a decline in bank stocks, the distinguishing feature of the
model is that the ratio of the value of domestic bank equities to the value of the entire stock market should
decline once the private sector realizes the deterioration of the banking sector. The ratio of the stock market
value of the banks to the total value of the stock market started to decline sharply in 1987, at least 3-4 years
before the beginning of the crisis, as shown in Figure 6 (from Dekle and Kletzer [2003]). This is consistent
with the prediction, special to our model, that the ratio of bank stock values to total stock values leads other
macroeconomic aggregate measures. Because asset pricesare veryresponsive tonewinformationregarding
future dividend growth and real interest rates, we argue that this offers good evidence in favor of a model
based on rational expectations in which consumption and investment are forward-looking.
In the model economy, the decline in the quality of bank portfolios leading up to a crisis is gradual
and caused by prospective government bailouts. The share of non-performing loans (NPLs) to total bank25
loans rises steadily before the crisis. Reliable NPL data are available only after 1992, when the Ministry
of Finance first recognized the NPL problem (again, a sudden change in the information of investors and
savers). The ratio of non-performing loans to total bank loans over the 1990s is shown in Figure 7 from
Dekle and Kletzer [2003]. Non-performing loans were 2 percent of GDP between 1992 and 1994, rose
sharply to about 5 percent of GDP in 1996 and were 7 percent of GDP in 2000.
Land is not included in the theoretical model, but land is important as collateral for a large proportion
of bank lending in Japan. Between 1980 and 1995, about 40 percent of all corporate borrowing was col-
lateralized by real estate (Ueda [2000]). The value of the capital stock with irreversible investment in the
model, however, parallels the value of other fixed assets that serve as collateral. The total value of collateral
suddenly falls in a banking crisis in the model. The dramatic decline in the value of land in Japan during
the 1990s parallels the collapse in the value of capital predicted by the model. Average land prices in Japan
declined by about 60 percent between 1992 and 2000, as shown on Figure 7. A common hypothesis that the
increase in the price of real estate over the 1980s contributed to an expansion in bank credit, which in turn
lead to higher rates of investment and economic growth.15 The causality predicted by our model runs the
opposite direction.
7.4 Vector Autoregression Estimates
Ourmodelyieldsrelationshipsbetweentheratioofthevalueofbankstockstothetotalstockmarketvalue
and subsequent investment, output growth, and bank credit growth. For example, a tightening of prudential
supervision and regulatory enforcement will reduce and T. This immediately lowers the bank equity ratio ,
and subsequently raises the path of investment (as a ratio of GDP), lowers the growth rate of bank credit to
GDP and the present value of collateral assets (as a ratio of GDP).
We test our theoretical prediction that the future paths of investment, bank credit, and the value of collat-
eralrespondtoshockstotheratio, butnottheconverse. WefirstestimateV ectorAutoregressions(V AR)with
the relevant variables, and then perform Granger causality tests to examine whether the bank equity ratio
is exogenous in the Granger sense. If so, the bank equity ratio temporally precedes the other variables in
our V ector Autoregression. The V AR is formed using four variables, the bank stock to the total stock market
value ratio, the investment to GDP ratio, the bank credit to GDP ratio, and an index of land prices. Although
land prices are not modeled directly, our model does capture the value of capital as collateral which becomes
a fixed asset in a crisis. This mimics land prices in a crisis, so we apply the implications of the model for
the value of collateral to land prices.
Table 4 depicts the V AR results with our four variables: BSTS (the bank equity ratio), CRED (the ratio of26
bankcredittoGDP),INVEST(theinvestmenttoGDPratio),andLANDPRIC(landprices). Theoptimallag
lengthoftwowaschosenbytheAkaikeInformationCriterion. IntheBSTSequation, besidesitsownlagged
values, none of the other variables are significant. In the CRED equation, besides its own lagged values,
only LANDPRIC lagged once is significant. In the INVEST equation, besides its own lagged values, both
LANDPRIC lagged once and twice are significant. In the LANDPRIC equation, none of the other variables
are significant.
We next perform Granger causality tests to ascertain whether one variable temporally precedes another.
In a V AR framework, Granger causality tests are Chi-squared tests of exclusion of all the lags of a particular
variable. For example, BSTS Granger causes CRED if BSTS(-1) and BSTS(-2) are jointly significant in the
CRED equation, but CRED(-1) and CRED(-2) are not jointly significant in the BSTS equation.
Table 5 depicts the results of the Granger causality tests in a V AR framework. In the BSTS equation,
none of the variables are significant. In fact, besides lagged BSTS, none of the variables contribute any
explanatory power. In the CRED equation, BSTS and LANDPRIC provide good explanatory power. In
the INVEST equation, BSTS and LANDPRIC again provide good explanatory power. In the LANDPRIC
equation, none of the variables are significant.
Taken together, these results are consistent with our theory. BSTS temporally precedes (Granger causes)
CRED and INVEST. That is, shocks to BSTS such as a tightening of prudential regulations raises INVEST
and CRED. BSTS does not temporally precede LANDPRIC. That is, BSTS and LANDPRIC appear to be
simultaneously determined. This is consistent with models in which as asset prices, both equity and land
prices respond to correlated future fundamentals.
8. Conclusion
Japanhashistoricallyhadabank-centeredfinancialsystem, orrelationshipbanking, wherethelong-term
and tight relationship between banks and corporate borrowers dominated financial intermediation. The effi-
cient functioning of relationship banking requires an effective mechanism to discipline banks to ensure the
prudent monitoring of debtor firms. As Horiuchi [2003] notes, it is difficult for outside investors to effec-
tively monitor bank management under relationship banking. For example, it is very difficult for outsider
investors to assess the quality of bank loans, creating the need for an agent to monitor and discipline bank
managers. Traditionally, the bank regulatory authority (in Japan’s case, the Banking Bureau of the Ministry
of Finance and the Financial Supervisory Agency) serves as monitor of bank portfolios and the actions of
bank managers.27
We have shown in this paper that the current difficulties faced by government regulators for resolving
the Japanese banking crisis follow from a recent history of regulatory forbearance and the failure to fulfill
this monitoring role. In this paper, we present a model in which regulatory forbearance, accompanied by
a high corporate reliance on bank borrowing and government implicit and explicit deposit insurance, can
lower the long-run growth rate of the economy and result in an endogenous banking crisis. The model
shows that deposit guarantees and slack financial regulation create incentives for banks to make transfers
to bank shareholders or depositors that are financed by the public sector, hence taxpayers in the future. The
accumulated,unrealized,depositinsuranceliabilityofthegovernmenttothebankingsectoristhepublicdebt
used to finance such transfers. Banks accumulate this public debt on the asset side of their balance sheets in
the form of non-performing loans, acknowledged or unacknowledged. In common usage, a banking crisis
is not clearly defined. In our model economy, the banking sector will deteriorate to the point of a liquidity
crisis with certainty unless regulatory forbearance ends and effective prudential regulations are enforced
that impose continuous loan-loss reserving, or its equivalent. One may wish to label the event of a rising
and irreversible deposit insurance liability for the government that must result in a sharp policy reversible
to avoid a crisis for investment finance a banking crisis. This is exactly what happens in our model if the
government steps in before the liquidity crisis occurs or not.
In our analysis, deposit insurance liabilities affect economic growth because public debt increases lower
aggregate wealth in the presence of distortionary taxes. Allowing these debts to accumulate lowers the
growth rate further, so that postponing regulatory intervention leads to larger declines in GDP growth. This
also holds true if the government continues to accumulate net deposit insurance liabilities after a banking
crisis begins. The model has two major policy implications. The first is that enforcement of individual
loan-loss reserves or loan write-downs eliminates the ability of bank managers to finance transfers to share-
holders or depositors from the public sector. The model also supports prompt intervention (for example,
implementation of Prompt Corrective Action in the case of Japan). Because the growth rate of the model
economy falls as deposit insurance liabilities rise against dividends paid out to shareholders or depositors,















where Pt is the stock price at time t, Dt+iis the dividend at time t + i, r is the interest (discount) rate, and
Bt+1is the bubbles component. The bubbles component is the deviation of the price from the fundamental
value of stocks or the present discounted value of dividends.












if the EtDt+i = Dt, for each i. When there is no bubble component and Dt+i follows a random walk, Pt
also follows a random walk. Therefore, the change in prices, ∆Pt, is a stationary process.



















we can again see that if there is no bubbles component, the stationarity of the change in dividends implies
that Pt − Dt
r is a stationary process. That is, Pt and Dt are cointegrated. Further, if dividends are a constant
fraction of earnings, Dt = γQt, then (A3) implies that stock prices and earnings are also cointegrated.
All of these relationships - the stationarity of the change in prices, the existence of cointegration between
stock prices and dividends, and stock prices and earnings - break down when bubbles exist, and Et
Bt+1
(1+r) is







That is, the bubble on stock prices is expected to be non-zero into the infinite future. The intuition is simply
that today, people will not pay in excess of the fundamental value of the stock, unless they can expect to
unload the stock for higher than fundamental value tomorrow. Likewise, tomorrow, people will not pay
above fundamental value, unless they can expect to unload the stock for higher than fundamentals the day
after tomorrow, and so on. In fact, with stationary dividends, at each date, people will expect the bubble to
increase at a rate greater than the interest rate, to compensate for the probability of bursting. Clearly, (A4),
as it enters into (A1) and (A3) will violate the condition that ∆Pt, Pt − Dt
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Endnotes
1This interpretation is explained at length in Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito [1997], Hutchison [1998], Hoshi and Patrick [2000],
Hoshi and Kashyap [1999], Hoshi and Kashyap [2002].
2Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito [1997] draw a comprehensive picture of the causes of the banking crisis in Japan. They emphasize
the roleplayed by monetary policy in precipitating the banking crisis. Theysuggest that the suddenshift toatighter monetarypolicy
in1989ledtoassetdeflationandtheresultingcollapseoflandpricesledtoariseinnon-performingloans. Ournon-monetarymodel
shows how bank lending with inadequate regulation can also lead to a bank crisis.
3Eventually, the government sold Nippon Credit to a software company and Long-Term Credit Bank to a foreign hedge fund.
4The derivation of simple loan contracts is explained in Freixas and Rochet [1997].
5Showing this is straightforward for the assumed uniform distribution of firm productivity. It is laborious and beside the point
of our paper.
6The agency model used in Dekle and Kletzer [2002a and b] is similar to that proposed by Chinn and Kletzer [2001] for the East
Asian crisis.
7Depositor monitoring of each bank’s accounts would allow reputational equilibria, for example.
8This is a consequence of perfect foresight. Suppose taxes were non-distortionary (lump sum) so that Ricardian equivalence
held. The household would save all its dividend income in deposits to pay future taxes, so that increased savings would match the
rise in the deposit insurance liabilities. With distortionary taxes, the deposit insurance claims of the banking sector net of the future
taxes they imply are a negative addition to wealth, adding to the rise in saving.
9For example, Hayashi and Prescott [2002] assume that 1/σ =0 .5 in their calibrated model for Japan.
10Inourmodel,thepositivevalueofbankequityderivesfromthispolicycombinationbecauseitallowsbankstopayoutdividends
against uncollected corporate interest.
11However, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay ([1997], p. 265) caution that when expected returns are simply persistent, we can
obtain the results in Table A2 of long-horizon forecastability spuriously.
12Under perfect foresight, corporate stock values grow in proportion to gross domestic product after the crisis for a constant tax
rate. If the tax rate varies over time (for example, to eliminate the deposit insurance liability, b, in finite time), the growth rate of
the value of the stock market will be different than the growth rate of output during the transition to the long-run simply because
the value of equity is a forward-looking variable. Therefore, it should not be taken as a prediction of our model that the value of the
stock market grows with output after time T because its behavior will depend on the policies adopted to resolve the crisis or private
sector expectations with respect to these policies.
13Investment irreversibility is used in the model for analytical simplicity. If smooth adjustment costs to disinvestment were
introduced, then a banking crisis would result in corporate bankruptcies and a falling price of capital, qt. While the model shows
that transactions in collateral should drop to zero in a crisis, it also implies that under more general adjustment costs the value of
collateral should fall below the growth rate of output in a crisis.
14The data reported in this paragraph are from Fukao, Inui, Kawai, and Miyagawa [2002].
15This is argued, for example, by Ogawa and Kitasaka [2000] and by Ueda [2000].                  Figures 1 and 2 
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Bank Stock/Total StockTable 1
                    Phillips-Perron Unit Root Statistics
Dates 1980Q2-2002Q2 1980Q2-1990Q4 1991Q1-2002Q2
Stock Returns -6.1 *** -3.2 ** -5.3 ***
Dividend-Price Ratio -1.5 -0.98 -1.5
Price-Price Ratio -2.3 * -1.7 -2.3 *
Rejection of Null Hypothesis of Unit Root:
*** Significant at 1 percent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.
* Significant at 10 percent level.Table 2
Long-Horizon Regressions of Stock Returns on Log Price-Earnings and,




  Coefficient -0.0076 -0.15 -0.58
  R-squared 0.0017 0.099 0.39
  T-statistic -0.41 -2.29 -5.18
Log Dividend-Price
  Coefficient -0.017 0.18 0.73
  R-squared 0.067 1.95 0.45
  T-statistic -0.77 0.09 5.53
Short Interest
  Coefficient 0.0027 0.017 0.059
  R-squared 0.011 0.056 0.17
  T-statistic -0.096 1.36 3.05
Standard-Errors are Newey-West.
Sample: 1980:2-2002:2.              Table 3
Fundamentals and Stock Returns
Dependent Variable: Stock Returns
               (Sample: 1980Q2-1997Q4)
Constant 0.022 0.36 -0.0007
(0.95) (1.96) (-0.69)
Stock Returns (-1) 0.13 0.22 …
(0.81) (1.51)
Stock Returns (-2) -0.11 -0.084 …
(-0.92) (-0.69)
Dividend-Price (-1) -0.29 … …
(-2.21)
Dividend-Price (-2) 0.33 … …
(2.55)
Price-Earnings (-1) … 0.17 …
(2.09)
Price-Earnings (-2) … -0.25 …
(-3.04)
Short-Interest (-1) 0.0053 0.0063 …
(0.39) (0.49)














R-squared: 0.27 0.29 0.29
Adj. R-squared: 0.19 0.22 0.19
T-statistics in parentheses.Table 4: VAR Estimates of Model
Equation
BSTS CRED INVEST LANDPRIC
Variable
BSTS(-1) 1.09 0.00043 0.023 36.71
(9.75) (0.15) (0.039) (1.01)
BSTS(-2) -0.16 0.0022 0.79 -12.29
(0.11) (0.75) (1.28) (-0.33)
CRED(-1) 1.16 0.76 -8.83 250.9
(0.25) (6.62) (-0.36) (0.17)
CRED(-2) -3.42 0.14 2.44 522.7
(-0.80) (1.36) (0.11) (0.38)
INVEST(-1) -0.011 -0.00048 0.068 4.63
(-0.52) (-0.91) (0.59) (0.68)
INVEST(-2) -0.0021 0.00026 0.0031 -0.15
(-0.099) (0.48) (4.61) (7.02)
LANDPRIC(-1) 0.000021 0.0000064 -0.0029 1.91
(0.17) (2.08) (-4.51) (47.6)
LANDPRIC(-2) 0.000055 -0.0000055 -0.0029 -0.95
(0.45) (-1.71) (-4.49) (23.78)
CONSTANT 0.61 0.014 1.58 -202.96
(0.33) (1.71) (0.89) (-1.91)
R-squared 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.99Table 5: Granger Causality/Chi-squared Exogeneity Test
Equation
Excluded BSTS CRED INVEST LANDPRIC
Variable Chi-sq Prob. 1/ Chi-sq Prob. Chi-sq Prob. Chi-sq Prob.
BSTS 3.41 0.18 5.94 0.05 12.81 0.0016 3.65 0.16
INVEST 2.93 0.23 1.91 0.38 0.73 0.69 3.09 0.21
LANDPRIC 4.13 0.13 5.17 0.07 21.3 0 3.35 0.19
Note: 1/ Probabililty Value 
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